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“I know my conduct is dangerous to others, but
I don’t care if someone is hurt or killed.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
On a fairly regular basis, prosecutors are faced with filing decisions with respect to fatal
traffic collisions. Many of them, of course, do not involve criminal negligence and are not
prosecuted as crimes. Sometimes, on the other hand, the circumstances are egregious and the
decision to be made is whether to file a case as a vehicular manslaughter2 or as a murder,3 on an
implied malice theory.4 There are a finite number of California Supreme Court and Court of
Appeal cases (beginning with People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290) that have addressed the
sufficiency of evidence for implied-malice murder in vehicular collision cases - and they are
each dependent on an analysis of the facts involved.
This article attempts to distill from recent case law the factors the California Supreme
Court5 and the Court of Appeal have highlighted as pivotal in determining whether to file a case
as a vehicular manslaughter or as a murder, in order to give prosecutors a paradigm from which
to operate.
The first section explains that upon facts showing wantonness and a conscious disregard
for human life a conviction for second degree murder is appropriate.6 The second section
highlights the significant factors the courts have used to aid in order to give prosecutors a better
understanding of the context in which this charge is appropriate. Finally, the last section sets
forth a compendium of cases, from which the facts commonly relied on can be derived. The
1

People v. Olivas (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 984, 988.
Cal. Penal Code Section 192(c).
3
Cal. Penal Code Sections 187-189. Murder of the second degree is [also] the unlawful killing of a human
being when: (1) The killing resulted from an intentional act, (2) The natural consequences of the act are
dangerous to human life, and (3) The act was deliberately performed with knowledge of the danger to, and with
conscious disregard for, human life. When the killing is the direct result of such an act, it is not necessary to
prove that the defendant intended that the act would result in the death of a human being. See Judicial Council
of California Criminal Jury Instructions (“CALCRIM”) No. 520; See also California Jury Instructions, Criminal,
7th Ed. (“CALJIC”) No. 8.31.
4
“Such malice may be express or implied. It is express when there is manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to
take away the life of a fellow creature. It is implied, when no considerable provocation appears, or when the
circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart. When it is shown that the killing
resulted from the intentional doing of an act with express or implied malice as defined above, no other mental state
need be shown to establish the mental state of malice aforethought. Neither an awareness of the obligation to act
within the general body of laws regulating society nor acting despite such awareness is included within the
definition of malice.” Cal. Penal Code Section 188.
Implied malice contemplates a subjective awareness of a higher degree of risk than does gross negligence, and
involves an element of wantonness which is absent in gross negligence. People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290,
296.
5
All references are to the California Supreme Court unless otherwise indicated.
6
California Penal Code Section 192(c).
2
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article concludes with a summary of factors prosecutors should look for when such a
determination is essential to their filing decision.
II.

A KILLING RESULTING FROM THE USE OF AN AUTOMOBILE MAY
CONSTITUTE EITHER SECOND DEGREE MURDER OR VEHICLUAR
MANSLAUGHTER DEPENDING ON THE UNDERLYING FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES
The court in People v. Contreras (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 944, first discussed the

distinction between murder and manslaughter. “Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being
… with malice aforethought.”7 Malice is implied “when circumstances attending the killing
show an abandoned and malignant heart.”8 Manslaughter by contrast is the unlawful killing of a
human being without malice.9 The required level of culpability for either gross vehicular
manslaughter while intoxicated10 or vehicular manslaughter11 is gross negligence.12 Both
statutes expressly provide they “shall not be construed as prohibiting or precluding a charge of
murder under Section 188 upon facts exhibiting wantonness and a conscious disregard for life to
support a finding of implied malice, or upon facts showing malice, consistent with the holding of
the California Supreme Court in People v. Watson [(1981)] 30 Cal.3d 290.”13
The court in Contreras then explained that the court in Watson distinguished gross
negligence from implied malice in a drunk driving case. Gross negligence was defined as the
exercise of so slight a degree of care as to raise a presumption of a conscious indifference to the
consequences.14 Implied malice requires proof the accused acted deliberately with conscious
disregard for life.15
Implied malice contemplates a subjective awareness of a higher degree of risk than does
gross negligence, and involves an element of wantonness which is absent in gross
negligence. [Citations.] [¶] … A finding of gross negligence is made by applying an
objective test: if a reasonable person in defendant's position would have been aware of
the risk involved, then defendant is presumed to have had such an awareness. [Citation.]
However, a finding of implied malice depends upon a determination that the defendant
actually appreciated the risk involved, i.e., a subjective standard. [Citation].16

7

Cal. Penal Code Section 187(a).
Cal. Penal Code Section 188.
9
Cal. Penal Code Sections 191.5(a), 192.
10
Cal. Penal Code Section 191.5.
11
Cal. Penal Code Section 192(c).
12
People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1204; People v. Bennett (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1032, 1036.
13
See bench notes, California Penal Code Section 192(c).
14
Watson at p. 297; See People v. Costa (1953) 40 Cal.2d 160, 166.
15
Watson at p. 297.
16
Watson at p. 296-97; Cal. Penal Code Section 188; see Kastel v. Stieber (1932) 215 Cal. 37, 46.
8
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It is the “conscious disregard for human life” that sets implied malice apart from gross
negligence.17
Even if the act results in a death that is accidental, as defendant contends was the case
here, the circumstances surrounding the act may evince implied malice. [Citations.]
Considerations such as whether the act underlying the homicide is a felony, a
misdemeanor or inherently dangerous in the abstract, are not dispositive in assessing
whether a defendant acted with implied malice. [Citations.] A finding of implied malice
must be based upon ‘consideration of the circumstances preceding the fatal act.
[Citations.]’18
Thus, the court in Contreras reasoned that the absence of intoxication or high-speed
flight from pursuing officers does not preclude a finding of malice. “These facts merely are
circumstances to be considered in evaluating culpability. Where other evidence shows ‘a wanton
disregard for life, and the facts demonstrate a subjective awareness of the risk created, malice
may be implied.19 In such cases, a murder charge is appropriate.’ [Citations.].”20
IV.

APPLICATION TO PROSECUTORIAL PRACTICE: THE FACTORS
In People v. Olivias (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 984, the court rejected the claim that a

conviction of vehicular second degree murder requires proof of all the factors identified in
Watson. The court stated that the distinction between that crime and the vehicular manslaughter
is admittedly subtle, but there is no formula to go by; rather, case-by-case analysis of the facts is
required.21 In other words, the court in Olivas held that the evidence adduced in Watson,
although sufficient to support the charge, was not necessary.22 Below is a list of the most
common factors used by the California Supreme Court and California Court of Appeals in
vehicular killing situations, it should be noted that each conviction for murder relied upon a
combination of these factors23 rather than one:

17

People v. Nieto Benitez (1992) 4 Cal.4th 91, 109; People v. Dellinger (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1212, 1221-1222; People
v. Protopappas (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 152, 162-164.
18
People v. Contreras (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 944, 954-955.
19
Cal. Penal Code Section 188.
20
People v. Contreras (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 944, 955.
21
People v. Olivas (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 984, 988-989. “The court explicitly rejected the claim that stated,
‘nowhere does the opinion in Watson state that all of the factors present in that case are necessary to a finding of
second degree murder … Watson … deliberately declin[ed] to prescribe a formula for an analysis of vehicular
homicide cases…’” People v. McCarnes (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 525, 535.
22
People v. Olivias (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 984, 988.
23
Albright, Contreras, Ortiz relied on three factors; Jarmon, McCarnes, Olivas, Watson, Whitson relied on four
factors; Sanchez relied on five factors; Autry and Murray relied on six factors; David relied on seven factors.

By: Kimberly Bird

5

1) Illegal Driving Maneuvers: Running red lights & stop signs
In David, Olivas, Watson and Whitson the court considered the fact that the defendant
was observed running through a red light,24 red lights,25 or stop signs.26 In Watson, the defendant
drove through a red light, narrowly avoiding a collision.27 In David, the court emphasized the
fact that the defendant was forced to stop only because when he drove through an intersection
where his signal was red, that he then “struck the victim’s vehicle with explosive force, killing
both occupants.”28 This situation is similar to Whitson, where the defendant ran through a red
light at a speed estimated to be 77 miles per hour and collided with another car, killing two
women.29 Horrifically, the defendant in Olivas, was observed by the officers chasing him,
running four stop signs and three red lights.30
In the most recent of these cases, the California Supreme Court in David held that “in
addition to the foregoing express admission by defendant of his awareness of the danger to life
posed by his driving, the evidence before the jury concerning the circumstances leading up to the
collision strongly supports a finding of such awareness.” 31 Therefore, if the defendant ran stop
signs or red lights prior to the killing or engaged in risky lane changes or passing, that
information is a contributing factor to aid the People in establishing a second degree murder
charge.
2) Speeding
Speeding is the most commonly seen factor among the vehicular murder cases.
California courts have considered speeding a factor anywhere from a finding of excess speed of
5 miles per hour to 70 miles per hour over the posted limit. In Albright, the defendant pressed
his accelerator to the floor of his station wagon reaching speeds of 90-110 miles per hour in a
residential area.32 In Autry, Murray and Ortiz, the defendants were traveling on a freeway and at
some point before the fatal collision reached speeds of up to 80 miles per hour.33 In Contreras,
David, Olivas, Watson, Whitson the defendant’s speed nearly doubled the posted speeds.34
24

People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290.
People v. David (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1109, 1111; People v. Olivas (1985) Cal.App.3d 984, 986.
26
People v. Olivas (1985) Cal.App.3d 984, 986.
27
People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 293.
28
People v. David (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1109, 1112; see also People v. Whitson (1998) 17 Cal.4th 229, 233..
29
People v. Whitson (1998) 17 Cal.4th 229, 233.
30
People v. Olivas (1985) Cal.App.3d 984, 986.
31
People v. Whitson (1998) 17 Cal.4th 229, 251 [emphasis added].
32
People v. Albright (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 883, 884.
33
See Autry at p. 356, Murray at p. 738 and Ortiz at p. 107.
34
Contreras - 55-60 m.p.h. in 25 m.p.h. zone, David - 60-80 m.p.h. in a 20 m.p.h. zone, Olivas - 50-100 m.p.h. in a
25-30 m.p.h. zone, Watson - 84 m.p.h. in a 35 m.p.h. zone, and in Whitson the defendant traveled 80-85 m.p.h. in a
residential area.
25
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The California Supreme Court in Watson said that second degree murder based on
implied malice has been committed when a person does “an act, the natural consequences of
which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that
his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.”35
Phrased in a different way, “malice may be implied when defendant does an act with a high
probability that it will result in death and does it with a base antisocial motive and with a wanton
disregard for human life.”36 The Watson Court believed that there existed a rational ground for
concluding that defendant’s conduct was sufficiently wanton to hold him on a second degree
murder charge. In reaching this conclusion, the court considered:
Defendant drove at highly excessive speeds through city streets, an act presenting a great
risk of harm or death … Defendant nearly collided with a vehicle after running a red
light; he avoided the accident only by skidding to a stop. He thereafter resumed his
excessive speed before colliding with the victims' car, and then belatedly again attempted
to brake his car before the collision (as evidenced by the extensive skid marks before and
after impact) suggesting an actual awareness of the great risk of harm which he had
created.37
In combination, these facts reasonably and readily support the conclusion that the
defendant actually appreciated the risk involved and nonetheless acted wantonly and with a
conscious disregard for human life.
3) Not Necessarily Illegal Driving Maneuvers: Swerving & Passing
In Autry, David, Murray, and Ortiz each of the defendants were observed swerving into
another lane,38 over the median,39 or into oncoming traffic before their fatal collisions.40 In
Autry, the defendant “recklessly drove on a freeway, swerved into the median strip, struck and
killed two highway construction workers, and injured his two passengers.”41 In David, the
defendant was observed passing slower southbound traffic by swerving over the double-double
yellow center lanes forcing northbound traffic out of its lanes.42 In Murray, the defendant
traveled against traffic about four miles primarily in the emergency lane next to the center
divider and the number one (fast) lane.43 In Ortiz, the defendant tried to overtake a vehicle
35

People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 719, quoting from People v. Phillips (1966) 64 Cal.2d 574, 587.)
Watson at p. 300.
37
Watson at p. 300.
38
People v. David (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1109, 1111.
39
People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 355.
40
People v. Murray (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 734, 737; People v. Ortiz (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 104, 107.
41
People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 355 [emphasis added].
42
People v. David (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1109, 1111 [emphasis added].
43
People v. Murray (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 734, 737.
36
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traveling in front of him by crossing a double yellow line on a state highway.44 Unfortunately,
the defendant found himself driving directly in the path of an oncoming vehicle on the other side
of the highway, causing his car to collide with the oncoming car, killing two occupants.45
The California Court of Appeal in Murray stated that the pattern of defendant’s driving,
that he was going the wrong way on the freeway, indicates that he had to be aware of the danger
posed to human lives, and knowing this, he deliberately proceeded in conscious disregard of that
risk.46
In Albright, court added to its finding of implied malice when the defendant passed three
cars before his fatal collision.47 Here, even though the defendant merely passed three cars, the
court reasoned that this showed he “knew other people were on the road.”48 In McCarnes, the
defendant repeatedly engaged in extremely dangerous passing maneuvers at speeds close to “65
plus” miles an hour on a two-lane road and that eventually lead to the head-on collision killing
four.49 The court decided when the defendant operated a motor vehicle in conscious disregard
for the safety of others, implied malice could be found sufficient to convict the defendant of
second degree murder.50 It is shown throughout these cases that the court has considered
swerving and passing as another contributing factor to aid in establishing a second degree murder
charge because it shows that the drivers were aware of other drivers when making their driving
decisions.
4) “Almost” collisions on the day of the killing
In Murray, Olivas and Watson, each defendant struck another car before their fatal
collisions. In Murray, the defendant first struck the side of one car, and caused another to
swerve out of control; two persons were injured when he did so;51 and then the defendant struck
another car head-on, killing all four persons inside.52 This court considered evidence of
defendant’s reckless driving up to 24 miles away from the point of collision.53

44

People v. Ortiz (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 104, 107.
People v. Ortiz (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 104, 106.
46
People v. Murray (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 734, 747.
47
People v. Albright (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 883, 884-885.
48
People v. Albright, (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 883, 887.
49
People v. McCarnes (1986) Cal.App.3d 525, 528.
50
People v. Albright (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 883, 887.
51
People v. Murray (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 734, 737.
52
People v. Murray (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 734, 737.
53
People v. Murray (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 734, 741, n.2 [emphasis added].
45
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This consideration is significant because the courts tend use this factor to show a
conscious awareness of one’s dangerous driving before the actual fatality. The Court of
Appeal in People v. Eagles54 explains this concept well:
Evidence of excessive speed resulting in a near collision is relevant to knowledge of risk,
‘an actual awareness of the great risk of harm’ of excessive speed … We agree with the
prosecutor at trial that it is a permissible inference that ‘[when] you’re driving around . . .
at a high rate of speed, almost cause an accident, you must see what the risk of harm is
that can follow it.’ What defendant knew in the afternoon he undoubtedly knew that
night before the fatal accident. The evidence was admissible to prove implied malice.55
5) Alcohol consumption
Alcohol consumption almost as frequent a factor as speeding is in the vehicular murder
cases. It is no surprise “[t]he drunk driver cuts a wide swath of death, pain, grief, and untold
physical and emotional injury across the roads of California and the nation.”56 That being said,
California’s legal blood alcohol content is .08 percent and drunk driving is a significant factor
considered when whether or not the killing is a murder or manslaughter. In the vehicular murder
cases, defendants have had a blood alcohol content ranging from .17 percent57 to .27 percent.58
In Watson the Supreme Court held, citing Taylor v. Superior Court that “‘One who wil[l]fully
consumes alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing that he thereafter must
operate a motor vehicle, thereby combining sharply impaired physical and mental faculties with
a vehicle capable of great force and speed, reasonably may be held to exhibit a conscious
disregard of the safety of others.’”59

54

People v. Eagles (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 330 [vehicular murder prosecution that did not involve the use of alcohol
or other toxicants].
55
People v. Eagles (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 330, 340; See also People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 301.
56
Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 898-899.
57
See Albright, Sanchez; see also Murray [defendant’s blood alcohol content was .18-.23 percent].
58
People v. McCarnes (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 525; see also Autry [defendant’s blood alcohol content was .22
percent];
see also Watson [defendant’s blood alcohol content was .23 percent].
59
People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 300-301. Cf. People v. Castorena (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 558 [where
defendant was convicted of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated and not second degree murder. In this
case, the defendant and several of his coworkers consumed four to five pitchers of beer over a period of several
hours, defendant then drove to a friend’s house, where he drank four glasses of brandy. Deciding to go home,
defendant tried to exit the house through a window, apparently mistaking it for the front door. His friend, concerned
about defendant’s level of intoxication, asked for his car keys and told defendant he should not drive and offered to
give him a ride. Defendant agreed initially and gave his keys his friend, and walked to the friend’s car. However,
defendant returned to the house, explaining he needed to drive his sister-in-law to work early the next morning.
After his friend returned his keys, the defendant left the house, only to return within a few minutes. He again
changed his mind, took his keys and drove away. “Traveling 70 to 100 miles per hour, often on the wrong side of
the road,” the defendant “ran several red lights.” Ultimately he rear-ended a car, injuring the driver and killing a
passenger. People v. Castorena (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 558, 559.]
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This factor shows both knowledge and conscious disregard that his driving while
intoxicated endangers the lives of others. Contreras court noted “the criminal act underlying
vehicular murder is not the use of intoxicating substances in anticipation of driving but is driving
under the influence with a conscious disregard for life. The former is not necessarily a finding of
the latter”60 Additionally, the court stated, “the absence of intoxication or high speed flight from
pursuing officers does not preclude a finding of malice.”61
6) Drug use
Interestingly, the three California vehicular murder cases, the drug of choice is
Phencyclidine (commonly referred to as “PCP”). In David, the defendant drove while under the
influence of PCP and collided with another vehicle on a Thanksgiving evening, killing its two
occupants.62 The court found implied malice necessary to uphold a second degree murder
conviction63 and based its finding on substantial evidence that supported defendant drove his
vehicle again64 knowing he was under the influence of PCP.65 It was held, in light of his prior
experience with PCP, he must have realized he was under the influence.66 The court also noted
“there is ample evidence … to support the conclusion appellant knew while he was driving that
his conduct was dangerous to life and consciously disregarded that risk.”67
In Jarmon, the court found the defendant deliberately ingested drugs, thereby including
his impaired state, with complete disregard to safety of others.68 The trial judge found that he
elected “to do drugs anyway and disregard the distinct possibility … [he] might kill somebody”
despite knowing “that drugs can produce bizarre effects which can cause conduct which is
dangerous to others.”69
In Olivas, the Court of Appeal noted the defendant had consumed enough PCP to impair
his physical and mental facilities, and then drove at extremely high speed through city streets for
a relatively lengthy period of time, creating a great risk to other drivers.70 The fact he was aware

60

People v. Olivas (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 944, 985; see People v. David (1994) 230 Cal.App.3d 1109 [because of
the defendant’s prior experience with PCP, the court rejected his argument that he lacked implied malice because no
evidence existed that he planned to drive when he consumed a PCP cigarette].
61
People v. Contreras (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 944, 955.
62
People v. David (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1109, 1111.
63
People v. David (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1109, 1115.
64
The defendant had two prior vehicle collisions resulting from driving under the influence of PCP, resulting in two
criminal convictions.
65
People v. David (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1109, 1114.
66
People v. David (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1109, 1114-1115.
67
People v. David (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1109, 1114-1115.
68
People v. Jarmon (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1345, 1351.
69
People v. Jarmon (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1345, 1351.
70
People v. Olivas (1985) Cal.App.3d 984, 989.
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of this risk, was shown by his collision with one car, his near collision with two other cars, and
his deliberate avoidance of two pursuing police cars.71
In combination, the use of drugs coupled with other factors is additional support to
establish the defendant acted wantonly and with a conscious disregard for human life.
7) Traffic Citations
In Contreras, the defendant had received nine serious traffic citations in the prior two
years.

72

In McCarnes, the defendant had previously been convicted of reckless driving.73 And,

the California Supreme Court in Whitson considered the facts the defendant was involved in a
traffic accident four years prior (for which police determined he was at fault for failing to yield
the right of way), received a citation for driving at an excessive speed and was cited for failing to
obey a posted sign two years before.74
In Ortiz, the court admitted evidence that the defendant had seven past incidents in which
the defendant had either been convicted of reckless driving, convicted of reckless drunk driving,
or been observed driving recklessly, and his participation in mandatory educational program
(known as the SB-38 program) on the dangers of drinking and driving.75
In ruling that the evidence of the defendant’s prior conduct was admissible, the trial court
states its rationale:
‘Every time the defendant drove badly before he allegedly committed these two
murders,’ the trial judge explained, ‘and every time he was convicted or arrested or
punished in some fashion, his awareness of the dangers of driving badly increased and
that is what the district attorney has a legitimate right to try to prove . . . [did] this
defendant have implied malice in his mind or not when he drove the way he did, and that
is a subjective standard. So we have to find out what he was exposed to that most people
aren’t exposed to in order to understand his level of awareness of the dangers of driving
badly.76
It appears that the introduction of “evidence relating to defendant’s poor driving record
and attendance at traffic school in order to support its claim that, at the time of the collision,
defendant subjectively was aware of the serious risk of death posed by his reckless driving.” 77

71

People v. Olivas (1985) Cal.App.3d 984, 989.
People v. Contreras (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 944, 947.
73
People v. McCarnes (1986) Cal.App.3d 525, 528-529.
74
People v. Whitson (1998) 17 Cal.4th 229, 235.
75
People v. Ortiz (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 104, 110.
76
People v. Ortiz (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 104, 115-116.
77
People v. Whitson (1998) 17 Cal.4th 229, 251.
72
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8) Driving Under the Influence (DUI) conviction(s)
The cases involving prior DUI convictions are numerous. The courts have allowed
evidence of one prior conviction78 up to admitting four prior convictions. In McCarnes wherein
the Court of Appeal for the Fourth District, Division Two, held that a defendant’s four prior
convictions for driving under the influence were admissible to establish implied malice in a
prosecution for second degree murder arising out of a vehicular homicide. In so holding, the
court pointedly observed:
[The] reason that driving under the influence is unlawful is because it is dangerous,
and to ignore that basic proposition, particularly in the context of an offense for which
the punishment for repeat offenders is more severe (Veh. Code, §§ 23165, 23170,
23175), is to make a mockery of the legal system as well as the deaths of thousands
each year who are innocent victims of drunken drivers. [para.] Moreover, included in
the evidence of two of defendant’s [four] convictions, as shown to the jury, was the
sentence that he enroll in and complete a drinking driver’s education program. Even if
we assume defendant did not realize after his convictions that it was dangerous to
drink alcohol and drive, surely realization would have eventually arrived from his
repeated exposure to the driver’s educational program. To argue otherwise is little
short of outrageous.79
In explaining why prior convictions for incidents involving alcohol were admissible
when the case before it did not involve the use of alcohol, the court in Ortiz further stated:
[T]he requisite mental state at the time of the prior incident -- one supporting a
subsequent finding of an awareness of the dangers of recklessness -- was not formed
while inebriated so much as before and after the resulting traffic incident. Whether
provoked by alcohol, other intoxicants, or road rage, such incidents typically include a
host of costly and inconvenient consequences. From this uncharged misconduct
evidence, through a series of inferences, a jury could conclude that, at the time of the
charged misconduct, the defendant possessed a ‘wanton disregard for life, and . . . a
subjective awareness of the risk created,’ from which ‘malice may be implied . . . .’80
In explaining why the prior conduct was admissible that the defendant possessed the
knowledge requisite for second degree murder under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision
(b), the court stated:
We emphasize the word ‘knowledge’ in the foregoing statutory enumeration because, in
seeking admission of the uncharged misconduct evidence at defendant’s trial, it was the
prosecution’s contention that the evidence was relevant because it tended to establish a
78
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subjective awareness on the part of defendant of the disastrous consequences that can
follow in the wake of recklessly operating a motor vehicle on a public highway. As
tending to establish, in other words, defendant’s knowledge--gained in the course of the
prior misconduct--of the natural consequences, dangerous to life, of the reckless
operation of a motor vehicle, and of his persistence in that behavior, thus evidencing a
conscious disregard for the lives of others on the road. These mental features, of course,
comprise the mens rea of implied malice, thereby supporting an accusation of second
degree murder.81
9) Mandatory classes taken related to drinking and driving
In David, the defendant had two prior vehicle collisions resulting from driving under the
influence of PCP, resulting in two criminal convictions. As part of his sentence, he also attended
two educational programs involving the risks of driving while under the influence of alcohol or
other intoxicants. The court held in light of his prior experience with PCP and attending
educational classes, the defendant must have realized he was under the influence and knew while
driving that this conduct was dangerous to life but consciously disregarded that risk.82
In Murray the defendant claimed attending mandatory educational classes did not
necessarily follow that he attained a subjective awareness of the courts material.83 Even though
the “bulk of these cases involved the use of alcohol or other intoxicants in both the uncharged
misconduct and the prosecution in which it was sought to be admitted. The resulting case law
makes it clear, however, that the contours of the ‘knowledge’ exception to the bar imposed by
section 1101(a) are not so restricted.”84 The court Autry noted that notwithstanding defendant’s
failure to attend educational programs, “…the jury could reasonably infer that the convictions
alone, even without the educational programs, impressed upon appellant the dangers of drunk
driving.”85
10) Forewarning before incident cautioning about dangerous driving
In Autry, the defendant’s “probation officer told him he should not drink and drive
because he might kill someone or be killed, and leave his children without a parent.”86 On the
day of the fatal accident, defendant was on probation.87 The very morning of the collision, he
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met with his probation officer who warned him not to drink and drive.88 In Jarmon, within a
two-week period before the collision, the defendant twice admitted to his parole officer that he
had ingested cocaine and PCP.89 At that time, the parole officer warned him that use of PCP
carried the “extreme potential for violence” which might cause “injury to himself [and] others
…”90 Finally, in Sanchez the defendant admitted+ his wife had told him not to drink and drive.91
The courts have used this factor to establish that “there was sufficient evidence to prove
defendant’s subjective awareness of the life-threatening consequences of his actions to support a
finding of implied malice, necessary to support the convictions.”92

V.

SUPPORTING CASE LAW
This section sets forth a compendium of cases, from which the facts commonly relied on

can be derived. The cases are listed in alphabetical order.
1. People v. Albright (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 883
On a hot July night defendant drank at least eight beers93 before pressing the accelerator
to the floor of his station wagon reaching speeds of 90-110 miles per hour.94 The defendant
passed three cars including smashing “into a 17 year old [boy’s] … car, killing him instantly in a
fiery explosion.”95 The court noted that none of the various witnesses heard the sound of brakes
or saw brake lights, nor were there any pre-impact skid marks.96 When the police found the
defendant, he was sitting next to his car and said, “I have killed someone, I have killed someone,
it should have been me.”97 The defendant then told the ambulance driver that he had “put the
pedal to the floor” because he wanted to kill himself, and that was why he was going as fast as he
could, and that the other car pulled out in front of him.98 “Defendant conceded the recklessness

88

People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 355.
Phencyclidine (commonly referred to as “PCP”). People v. Jarmon (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1345, 1349.
90
People v. Jarmon (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1345, 1350.
91
People v. Sanchez (2001) 24 Cal.4th 983, 987.
92
People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 357.
93
Defendant’s blood alcohol content was .17 – the People established this significantly slowed his reactions,
imparted his judgment, balance and coordination, restricted his vision and made him 35 times more likely to have an
accident than an unintoxicated driver.
94
People v. Albright (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 883, 884.
95
People v. Albright (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 883, 884-885.
96
People v. Albright (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 883, 884-885.
97
People v. Albright (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 883, 884-885.
98
People v. Albright (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 883, 885.
89

By: Kimberly Bird

14

of his behavior, but argued he was so drunk he could not have harbored malice required to
establish second degree murder.”99
The court found that defendant knew other people were on the road and must have known
of the high probability he would case death if he continued his conduct.100 The Court of Appeals
found that when defendant had willfully consumed alcohol beverages to the point of intoxication
and then operated a motor vehicle in conscious disregard for the safety of others, implied malice
could be found sufficient to convict the defendant of second degree murder.101
2. People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351
In People v. Autry, the defendant had a blood-alcohol level of .22 percent and “recklessly
drove on a freeway, swerved into the median strip, struck and killed two highway construction
workers, and injured his two passengers.”102 Defendant “had four prior convictions for drunk
driving, suffered in 1983, 1984, and 1991.”103 Interestingly, “he failed to attend court-ordered
educational programs in connection with those convictions, but in 1991 admitted that he had a
drinking problem and participated in a 45-day residential alcoholism program at ‘How House,’
where participants are ‘bombarded’ with horror stories about the dangers of driving while
intoxicated.” 104
In October 1991, his “probation officer told him he should not drink and drive because he
might kill someone or be killed, and leave his children without a parent.”105 On the day of the
fatal accident, defendant was on probation.106 That very morning, he met with his probation
officer who warned him not to drink and drive.107
Nevertheless, that day appellant drove his Ford Bronco to the desert where he and his
friends drank beer, bought more beer and drove while drinking two beers. Defendant, “who by
then appeared under the influence, lost control, swerved and skidded because he was going too
fast, about 70 or 80 miles per hour.”108 After “falling asleep and waking up handcuffed to a
hospital bed and being told he was under arrest for killing two people, appellant said, ‘Fuck ‘em.
They shouldn’t have been out there in the first place.’”109
99
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The Court of Appeals upheld that “there was sufficient evidence to prove defendant’s
subjective awareness of the life-threatening consequences of his actions to support a finding of
implied malice, necessary to support the convictions.”110
3. People v. Contreras (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 944
In People v. Contreras, the defendant, a “bandit” tow truck driver who had received nine
serious traffic citations in the prior two years, knew his brakes were defective but still drove
recklessly at high speed in a residential area, rear-ending a vehicle at a stop sign while racing
into a accident scene. On the day of the offense, Contreras was racing another tow truck driver
side-by-side on a public street at 55-60 miles per hour in a 25 mile per hour zone in an attempt to
be the first tow truck on the scene of the accident.111 He collided with a car, killing a 13-year-old
boy inside.112 The court rejected the claim that a murder charge cannot be based on accidental
homicide that does not involve a high-speed chase or drug-impaired driving and upheld the
evidence to support a second degree murder conviction on an implied malice theory.113
In other words, “the absence of intoxication or high speed flight from pursing officers
does not preclude a finding of malice. These facts are circumstances to be considered when
evaluating culpability.”114 In upholding the murder conviction, the court stated “where evidence
shows “a wanton disregard for life, and the facts demonstrate a subjective awareness of the risk
created, malice may be implied. In such cases, a murder charge is appropriate.”115
4. People v. David (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1109
The defendant was driving under the influence of PCP116 when he collided with another
vehicle on a Thanksgiving evening, killing its two occupants.117 The police first observed the
defendant driving his vehicle 60-80 miles per hour in a residential area where the posted speed
was 40 miles per hour.118 Then the defendant was observed running through red lights, passing
slower southbound traffic by swerving over the double-double yellow center lanes forcing
northbound traffic out of its lanes.119 He was forced to stop because when he drove through an
intersection where his signal was red, he struck the victim’s vehicle with explosive force, killing

110

People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 357.
People v. Contreras (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 944, 947.
112
People v. Contreras (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 944, 952.
113
People v. Contreras (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 944, 953.
114
People v. Contreras (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 944, 955.
115
People v. Contreras (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 944, 955.
116
Phencyclidine (commonly referred to as “PCP”).
117
People v. David (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1109, 1111.
118
People v. David (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1109, 1111.
119
People v. David (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1109, 1111.
111

By: Kimberly Bird

16

both occupants – his vehicle “ricocheting back onto the street, and finally come to rest along the
center divider.”120
The defendant had two prior vehicle collisions resulting from driving under the influence
of PCP, resulting in two criminal convictions.121 As part of his sentence, he also attended two
educational programs involving the risks of driving while under the influence of alcohol or other
intoxicants.122 At the time of the fatal Thanksgiving crash, the defendant was in fact, driving
with a suspended license.
The Court of Appeal found there was substantial evidence supporting the finding of
implied malice and second degree murder.123 The court based its finding on substantial evidence
that supported defendant drove knowing he was under the influence of PCP.124 In light of his
prior experience with PCP, the court held that he must have realized he was under the
influence.125 The court also noted “there is ample evidence … to support the conclusion
appellant knew while he was driving that his conduct was dangerous to life and consciously
disregarded that risk.”126
5. People v. Jarmon (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1345
In People v. Jarmon, the defendant rear-ended a car, killing four people and injuring two
others while driving under the influence of PCP and alcohol.127 Defendant ran a red stoplight
and applied his brakes only a split second before the accident.128 One month prior to the killing,
defendant was released from prison.129 One of the conditions of his parole was to participate in
antinarcotics testing.130 Within a two week period before the collision, the defendant admitted
twice admitted to his parole officer that he had ingested cocaine and PCP.131 The parole officer
warned him that use of PCP carried the “extreme potential for violence” which might cause
“injury to himself [and] others …”132 The defendant continued to use, sometimes in
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combination: cocaine, marijuana, PCP and alcohol, even after the warning.133 Additionally, the
defendant had previously been convicted of drunk driving.134
The Court of Appeal held the evidence supported a finding that defendant deliberately
ingested drugs, thereby including his impaired state, with complete disregard to safety of
others.135 “Where circumstances reasonably support the conclusion that a defendant does act
with a high probability that it will result in death and does it with a base antisocial motive and
with a wanton disregard for human life.’”136 The court noted the trial judge found that he elected
“to do drugs anyway and disregard the distinct possibility … [he] might kill somebody” despite
knowing “that drugs can produce bizarre effects which can cause conduct which is dangerous to
others.”137 Thus, the court affirmed his convictions for second degree murder.
6. People v. McCarnes (1986) Cal.App.3d 525
The defendant was convicted of two counts of second degree murder138 on a summer
Saturday afternoon when he killed two people while driving with a blood alcohol level of .27
percent.139 The evidence established that the defendant repeatedly engaged in extremely
dangerous passing maneuvers at speeds close to “65 plus” miles an hour on a two-lane road and
collided head-on with a VW station wagon. There were six people in the VW.140 After the
collision, defendant walked to the vicinity of the VW and a bystander was giving artificial
respiration to the baby, who was according to the witness missing “a big chunk of her head.” 141
Defendant then leaned over and said “Don’t die, baby, don’t die,” and walked away.142 When
the police approached defendant he ran into a field.143
The defendant had previously been convicted four times for driving under the influence
of alcohol or alcohol and drugs, and had also previously been convicted of reckless driving.144
The court found that driving by a person who has a blood alcohol level of .27 percent, and who
133
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executes two extremely reckless passing maneuvers and embarks on a third in the face of
oncoming vehicles, has “natural consequences … which are danger to life,” or “a high
probability [of] result[ing] in death.”145
The court also included, such “evidence, coupled with the defendant’s four previous
convictions for driving under the influence, [was] not only sufficient but overwhelmingly
uph[eld] the finding of implied malice.”146 The court articulated that the defendant’s argument
that there is no substantial evidence his actions could result in death … “is nonsense, if not an
affront to this court.”147 Here, of course, the court said “that defendant’s four previous
convictions for drunken driving, and his repeated exposure to a drinking drivers’ education
program” provide additional elements not present in Watson.148 Moreover, “nowhere does the
opinion in Watson state that all of the factors present in that case are necessary to a finding of
second degree murder … Watson … deliberately [declined] to prescribe a formula for analysis of
vehicular homicide cases, instead requiring a case-by-case approach.”149
7. People v. Murray (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 734
The court considered evidence of defendant’s reckless driving up to 24 miles away from
the point of collision where defendant drove the opposite way on the freeway crashing into a
vehicle and killing its occupants.150 In this case, the defendant killed four people in a head-on
collision and injured two others while driving drunk with a blood alcohol level between .18 and
.23 percent as he drove eastbound on the westbound side of the freeway at speeds of 55-80 miles
per hour.151 Traveling against traffic, primarily in the emergency lane net to the center divider
and the number one (fast) lane, he drove about four miles.152 He first struck the side of one car,
and caused another to swerve out of control; two persons were injured when he did so.153 The
defendant then struck head-on another car, killing all four persons inside.154
Evidence established the defendant had earlier been convicted of driving under the
influence and ordered to attend traffic school.155 Shortly thereafter, he was arrested, again
convicted of driving under the influence, placed on probation, an ordered to attend an approved
145
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drinking program.156 Notwithstanding these convictions and attendance at the drinking program,
he had three beers at lunch, 10-12 beers at an after-work party, and another 5-8 on the day and
evening of the fatal collision.157
In rejecting the defendant’s argument that insufficient evidence supported an implied
malice finding, the Court of Appeal observed he had deliberately chose on the day of the fatal
collision to drive his truck to work so he could attend the drinking party after work.158 Further,
the defendant thereafter deliberately chose to drink and drive – knowing that after the party he
would have to drive a long distance home.159 Here, the court mentioned that the pattern of
defendant’s driving, that he was going the wrong way on the freeway, indicates that he had to be
aware of the danger posed to human lives, and knowing this, he deliberately proceeded in
conscious disregard of that risk.160
8. People v. Olivas (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 984
In People v. Olivas, the police, at high speeds, pursued the defendant while he was
driving a brand new car stolen earlier that day from an automobile dealership.161 Two police
cars were involved in the chase, reaching speeds between 50-100 miles per hour on city streets
with speed limits of 25-30 miles per hour; during the chase, the defendant ran four stop signs and
three red lights. After narrowly avoiding a collision with other cars when he ran the first light,
he ran a stop sign while traveling 57 miles per hour in a 25 mile per hour zone and struck a
vehicle broadside – killing a nine month old child inside and causing the driver who was two
months pregnant to miscarry.162 A blood sample taken from the defendant “was found to contain
.02 percent blood alcohol and .04 parts per million of PCP.” 163
In finding there was sufficient evidence of implied malice, the Court of Appeal noted the
defendant had consumed enough PCP to impair his physical and mental facilities, and then drove
at extremely high speed through city streets for a relatively lengthy period of time, creating a
great risk to other drivers.164 The fact he was aware of this risk, was shown by his collision with
one car, his near collision with two other cars, and his deliberate avoidance of two pursuing
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police cars.165 Although he was further appraised of the risk when he nearly collided with two
more cars while running the first red light, he nonetheless “chose to continue his extremely
dangerous driving even after the danger to the lives of others was demonstrated.”166 And, the
court expressly held, “[t]he criminal act underlying vehicular murder is not use of intoxicating
substances in anticipation of driving, but is driving under the influence with conscious disregard
for life.”167
9. People v. Ortiz (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 104
In People v. Ortiz, the court discussed the admissibly of evidence of a defendant’s prior
conduct in a vehicular murder case to show his subjective awareness of the risk he created.168 In
that case a jury found the defendant guilty to second degree murder, arising from his
involvement in a head-on vehicular collision in which two of four family members, visiting
California from New Zealand, died.169
The defendant had likely been driving at least 80 miles per hour,170 tried to overtake a
vehicle traveling in front of him by crossing a double yellow line on a state highway.171
Unfortunately, the defendant found himself driving directly in the path of an oncoming vehicle
on the other side of the highway. Defendant’s truck collided with the oncoming car and the two
occupants were killed.172 Earlier on in the morning of the collision, defendant had driving his car
recklessly, traveling at high speeds, tailgating cars and passing them over double yellow lines on
a curve.173
The parties stipulated, prior to trial, that the defendant was not under the influence of any
intoxicant at the time of the accident.174 At trial, over defense objection the trial court admitted
evidence consisting of documentary and oral testimony concerning seven past incidents in which
the defendant had either been convicted of reckless driving, convicted of reckless drunk driving,
or been observed driving recklessly, and his participation in mandatory educational program
(known as the SB-38 program) on the dangers of drinking and driving.175
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In ruling that the evidence of the defendant’s prior conduct was admissible, the trial court
states its rationale:
‘Every time the defendant drove badly before he allegedly committed these two
murders,’ the trial judge explained, ‘and every time he was convicted or arrested or
punished in some fashion, his awareness of the dangers of driving badly increased and
that is what the district attorney has a legitimate right to try to prove . . . [did] this
defendant have implied malice in his mind or not when he drove the way he did, and that
is a subjective standard. So we have to find out what he was exposed to that most people
aren’t exposed to in order to understand his level of awareness of the dangers of driving
badly.176
The Court of Appeal affirmed. The court held that the trial court did not err in admitting
evidence of the defendant’s past conduct, including the alcohol-related conduct, as relevant to
the determination whether the defendant had the wanton disregard for human life requisite to
establish a finding of implied malice.177 The court further held the trial court properly ruled this
evidence admissible as more probative than prejudicial.178 Finally, the court held that any error
was not prejudicial, given the admissible evidence of the egregiousness of defendant’s reckless
driving at the time of the accident.
10. People v. Sanchez (2001) 24 Cal.4th 983
In People v. Sanchez, the defendant was the driver of a Ford Bronco that killed a man.179
Defendant was charged with both murder and gross vehicular manslaughter.180
In statements to the police and at trial, he gave conflicting accounts of the circumstances
of the collision and of his own alcohol consumption preceding the collision.181 He admitted
some alcohol consumption,182 but denied feeling intoxicated. “Because of various indications
that he was under the influence of alcohol, defendant was arrested at the scene, and en route to
the police station he commented laughingly that he was scheduled to appear on another drivingunder-the-influence charge that morning.” 183 He also commented that his wife had told him not
to drink and drive.184
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In addition, the defendant had sustained two prior convictions for driving under the
influence of alcohol, and one additional such charge was pending against him.185 He was
ordered to attend a drinking driver’s educational program, but failed to do so.186 Finally, the
defendant had been driving without a valid driver’s license since 1988, when his license was
suspended in connection with his first conviction.187
Here, the California Supreme Court held that gross vehicular manslaughter while
intoxicated is not a lesser included offense of murder, and thus defendant could be convicted of
both offenses.188 Gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated requires proof of elements that
need not be proved when the charge is murder, that is, use of a vehicle and intoxication.189
11. People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290
In People v. Watson, the California Supreme Court specifically addressed the
applicability of an implied malice second degree murder theory to a vehicular manslaughter
homicide. In this case, the defendant consumed large quantities of beer and then drove through a
red light, narrowly avoiding a collision.190 He then drove away at high speed reaching 84 miles
per hour and, despite applying his brakes, struck a car at another intersection; where he struck a
Toyota sedan and three passengers were ejected from the vehicle and the driver and her six-yearold daughter were killed.191 There were 112 feet of skid marks prior to impact and another 180
feet thereafter.192 The defendant’s sped was estimated by experts at 70 miles per hour at the
point of impact.193 His blood-alcohol level one-half hour after the collision was .23 percent.194
The defendant was charged with two counts of second degree murder and two counts of
vehicular manslaughter, but the trial court granted his motion to dismiss the murder counts.
Held, order of dismissal reversed.
The California Supreme Court in Watson held: (a) The general murder statutes, P.C. 187
et seq., are not preempted by the more specific vehicular manslaughter statute195; and (b) The
defendant’s conduct was sufficiently wanton to support a second degree murder charge. He
drove his car to an establishment where he consumed a large quantity of beer. He then drove at
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an excessive speed through city streets, presenting a great risk of harm.196 After narrowly
missing one vehicle, he resumed an excessive speed and then attempted to brake his car before
impact, suggesting an actual awareness of the great risk of harm he had created.197
The court noted that the evidence adduced at the preliminary examination was not
necessarily sufficient to convict the defendant of second degree murder and that the prosecution
must still establish implied malice beyond a reasonable doubt. “Moreover, we neither
contemplate nor encourage the routine charging of second degree murder in vehicular homicide
cases. We merely determine that the evidence before us is sufficient to uphold the second degree
murder counts in the information.”198
12. People v. Whitson (1998) 17 Cal.4th 229
In People v. Whitson, the defendant was guilty of two counts of second degree murder,
arising from two deaths that occurred when defendant, while driving a VW, ran through a red
light at a speed estimated to be 77 miles per hour and collided with another car.199 Here, the
defendant was being chased by an officer on a motorcycle and when the officer activated his
emergency lights and siren the VW sped up to 80-85 miles per hour.200 The officer saw the VW
turn off his headlights, maneuver around two vehicles and then the officer lost track of the
VW.201 Immediately thereafter, the officer observed a scene of a “major injury accident” crash
between the VW and an Acura sedan.202 Both the driver and the passenger of the Acura sedan
bled to death.203
There was no evidence the defendant was under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the
time of the collision and the defendant possessed a California driver’s license at the time of the
collision.204 At the time of trial, evidence was introduced pertaining to the defendant’s driving
record;205 establishing that defendant had attended traffic school, was involved in a traffic
accident four years prior (for which police determined he was at fault for failing to yield the right
of way), received a citation for driving at an excessive speed and was cited for failing to obey a
posted sign two years before.206 The prosecution “introduced the evidence relating to
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defendant’s poor driving record and attendance at traffic school in order to support its claim that,
at the time of the collision, defendant subjectively was aware of the serious risk of death posed
by his reckless driving.” 207 The Court found that “even without the evidence of defendant’s
poor driving record … there was strong evidence establishing that defendant was aware of the
serious risks from his dangerous driving--including, most significantly, his explicit admission, in
one of his pretrial statements to the police, that he realized that his driving on the night in
question was dangerous and that while driving he was ‘afraid I’m going to kill someone or hurt
someone else.’” 208
The Court reasoned that “In addition to the foregoing express admission by defendant of
his awareness of the danger to life posed by his driving, the evidence before the jury concerning
the circumstances leading up to the collision strongly supports a finding of such awareness.” 209
VI.

CONCLUSION
While there is certainly no hard and fast rule for determining whether a vehicle killing is

a crime of murder or manslaughter, but there are common factors that continually emerge from
the Court’s analyses of what constitutes a sufficient degree of factors among to affirm a
conviction of second degree murder. The common factors to consider they are:
11) Illegal Driving Maneuvers: Running red lights & stop signs
12) Speeding
13) Not Necessarily Illegal Driving Maneuvers: Swerving & Passing
14) “Almost” collisions on the day of the killing
15) Alcohol consumption
16) Drug use
17) Traffic Citations
18) Driving Under the Influence (DUI) conviction(s)
19) Mandatory classes taken related to drinking and driving
20) Forewarning before incident cautioning about dangerous driving
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To withstand a possibility of reversal, a prosecutor should objectively evaluate the facts
of his or her particular case and pinpoint these commonalities, presenting them to the trial judge
with the aforementioned case law to back up their factual analysis. With these stepping-stones in
mind, the road to proper filing need not be so harrowing, and, with the proper facts and
presentation, a proper charge will be the result.
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